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ABSTRACT
Metacognitive and epistemological reflection are often perceived as 
being beyond the perceptive and cognitive abilities of young children. 
Research, however, has proven that at a very early stage of develop-
ment children are naturally intrigued by their own minds, observe and 
draw conclusions, build personal conceptions of knowledge and cog-
nition, and quickly move from the stage of “naïve theories of mind” 
to reflecting on more advanced epistemological phenomena. The aim 
of this article is present the idea of epistemological reflection and its 
role in the development of children’s conceptions of knowledge and 
cognition. Theoretical considerations will be complemented with 
a research project driven by the following research questions: What 
is the conception of knowledge among young children? What differ-
ences do they perceive between knowledge and learning? Visual and 
verbal explanations prepared by children will be used to present the 
role such personal epistemology plays in future self-regulation com-
petency and in constructing children’s ability to evaluate their own 
learning and set new aims. In summary, the conclusions for educa-
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Introduction
What sets apart a good school from a bad one in the modern world is the impor-
tance it attaches to shaping the cognitive independence of  a  child: their ability to 
learn independently and to take responsibility for the results of  their work. As the 
experts of  the EU Council stress, in the contemporary, knowledge-based economy, 
the mere memorization of facts, concepts, dates, and procedures—although extremely 
important—is not enough to ensure the wellbeing, progress, and success of both the 
individual and the community. According to Hoskins and Fredrikson, in our rapidly 
changing society, skills such as problem-solving, critical thinking, the ability to coop-
erate, creative thinking, numeracy, and self-regulation are more essential than ever. 
These are tools that allow what has been learned to be put into practice in real time in 
order to generate new ideas, theories, products, and knowledge (Hoskins, Fredrikson 
2018: C189/1). From this perspective, the key dimensions of learning, which form 
the basis of self-regulation, are as follows (Hoskins, Fredrikson, 2008: 28–30):
• metacognitive reflection, defined as “thinking about thinking,” that is, the ability 
to consciously monitor and regulate the course of knowledge acquisition, to per-
ceive and correct one’s errors in thinking, to critically evaluate the results of cogni-











Refleksja metapoznawcza i  epistemologiczna są często uważane za 
formy aktywności niedostępne percepcji małego dziecka. Tymczasem 
badania świadczą, że dzieci już na stosunkowo wczesnych etapach roz-
woju są żywotnie zainteresowane tym, co dzieje się w umyśle człowie-
ka, obserwują i wyciągają wnioski, formułują własne, osobiste teorie 
wiedzy i  uczenia się, szybko przechodząc od tzw. „naiwnych teorii 
umysłu” do rozważań natury epistemologicznej. Celem niniejszego ar-
tykułu jest przybliżenie czytelnikom istoty refleksji epistemologicznej 
i roli, jaką odgrywa ona w rozwoju dziecięcych koncepcji wiedzy i po-
znania. Analizy teoretyczne wzbogacone zostaną prezentacją projektu 
badawczego, który zmierzał do znalezienia odpowiedzi na następujące 
pytania: Jaką koncepcją wiedzy posługują się dzieci w młodszym wie-
ku szkolnym? Jakie dostrzegają różnice między wiedzą a uczeniem się? 
Na podstawie analizy semantycznej zebranych wypowiedzi graficznych 
i werbalnych dzieci ukazana zostanie rola osobistej epistemologii jako 
istotnego wymiaru przyszłej kompetencji w świadomym regulowaniu 
własnego uczenia się, ocenianiu jego skuteczności i wyznaczaniu so-
bie kolejnych celów. W podsumowaniu tekstu przedstawione zostaną 
wnioski dla praktyki edukacyjnej.
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• epistemic thinking, i.e., understanding the essence and structure of knowledge, 
and realizing the criteria of its validity and credibility (Kuhn 2000; Hofer 2004).
The main goal of the article is to focus the reader’s attention on the epistemologi-
cal framework, which is least present in the education of a young child. The first part 
of  this article presents a  short overview of  the most important psycho-pedagogical 
research on the development of childhood concepts of knowledge and cognition, as 
well as the discrepancies in the definitions. The second part presents a research pro-
ject on children’s understanding of the essence of knowledge. Based on pupils’ visual 
and verbal expressions, I demonstrate the potential of a child’s epistemic thinking at 
an earlier school age, which may be supported or obstructed by the epistemological 
atmosphere created in the classroom by the teacher.
Epistemological Thinking: Definitions
The epistemic thinking of young children is rarely the subject of pedagogical con-
siderations. Although much research on the development of epistemological thought 
has been carried out since the 1970s, most researchers have focused on adolescence 
and early adulthood, which are considered to be a time of drastic, crucial develop-
mental changes (King, Kitchener 2004). Interestingly, the term epistemic thinking/
epistemological knowledge does not have a  single, universally accepted definition. 
Researchers disagree about the course (mechanism) of epistemological thought and 
the forms under which it manifests in the human mind (cf. Bendixen, Feuch 2010; 
Bendixen, Rule 2004; Briell et al. 2011; Hofer, Bendixen 2012). To what extent is 
epistemological knowledge metacognitive? Does it depend on the discipline, or is it 
rather general and cross-disciplinary? What representations do the fruits of  episte-
mological thinking have in the human mind: is it an internally coherent and orderly 
system of beliefs, activated in a problematic situation, or rather the processes of rea-
soning/reflection and underlying assumptions/pre-concepts, or perhaps even more 
primary, not fully conscious forms of understanding? Is this knowledge organized and 
ordered like a theory, or does it appear in a form similar to that of common knowledge, 
i.e., naïve, unstable, often self-contradictory, and susceptible to changes under the 
influence of current experiences (Kuhn, Weinstock 2002)? The disagreement among 
researchers as to the essence and structure of personal epistemology result not only 
in differences in research methodology, but also in terminological chaos. In a meta-
analysis of over 600 scientific publications, Briell et al. (2011: 8–11) distinguished as 
many as 39 different terms used to describe people’s beliefs about knowledge. Some 
of the most commonly used concepts are summarized below, mainly to make readers 
aware of the scope of discrepancies in definitions from this area of research:
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1. Epistemic cognition (King, Kitchener 2004) – the ability to consciously re-
flect on the limits of  cognition, the certainty of  cognition, and the criteria 
of the validity of knowledge; the process that is triggered when solving com-
plex, poorly-structured problems. “While meta-cognition allows one to moni-
tor Level 1 [computing, memorizing, reading, and perceiving] and Level  2 
processes [being able to monitor one’s progress when engaged in Level 1 tasks], 
epistemic cognition allows the monitoring of problem types and the evaluation 
of the proposed solutions” (2004: 38);
2. Epistemological beliefs (Schommer-Aikins 2002) – a form of personal, com-
mon-sense, and emotionally charged knowledge that reflects the beliefs, at-
titudes, and values of an individual which are connected with knowledge and 
the cognitive process (a complex system of beliefs that operate and develop 
more or less independently);
3. Epistemic metacognition (Hofer 2004)  – beliefs concerning a) the nature 
of knowledge (including the degree of certainty of knowledge, of its complex-
ity, and of oneself as a “knowing” subject) and b) the anatomy of the cogni-
tion process (including the awareness of the sources of one’s own knowledge, 
the criteria of its validity/justification, and the ability to regulate the processes 
of constructing one’s knowledge); and
4. Epistemic thinking (Barzilai, Zohar 2014) – a term that encompasses both 
epistemic cognition (defined as thinking about the epistemological characteris-
tics of specific information, statements, or sources of knowledge) and epistem-
ic metacognition (i.e., knowledge, skills, and experiences regarding the general 
nature of knowledge and cognition strategies). 
The last term is clearly an attempt to reconcile the variety of definitions, i.e., to 
include in one broad concept all aspects of epistemological thought which scholars 
single out in the literature. Underlying this concept is the belief that what distin-
guishes epistemic thinking from other cognitive processes is not its different structures 
or patterns, but the subject matter and content of thoughts. It is in this understanding 
that the term epistemic thinking is used in this article. Without purporting to make 
judgements on how epistemic knowledge manifests in a  child’s mind—as “theory-
in-action” as Barbara Hofer argued (2004), or rather as loose, common-sense beliefs, 
as Marlene Schommer-Aikins (2002) claimed, I am interested in the content of this 
knowledge at a certain stage of development and in the possibilities of supporting its 
development in the education of children.
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The Development of Epistemic Thinking in Young Children
As Maria Ledzińska and Maria Czerniawska proclaimed, although there are val-
id grounds to claim that the basic forms of metacognitive knowledge and epistemic 
thought are present even in very young children, “they become common only when 
an individual is able to abstract and consciously reflect on the course of their own cog-
nitive processes” (2011: 357). It was their lack of the capacity for abstract thinking, 
generalization, and conscious introspection that for many years fueled the disregard 
for the epistemic potential of young children. The research by Deanna Kuhn (2000), 
who noted that the sources of epistemological development should be sought in early 
childhood theories of  mind, is considered groundbreaking in this respect. Under-
standing the so-called false beliefs, i.e., the fact that someone may perceive, experi-
ence, and interpret a given situation in a completely different way than we do, is the 
first step towards a  subjective, interpretative concept of knowledge (Białecka-Pikul 
2012; Carpendale, Chandler 1996; Wellman 1985). Kuhn based her argumentation 
on the premise that epistemic thinking should be defined as the declarative dimension 
of metacognition: 
Metacognitive functions can be procedural or declarative. The former refer to aware-
ness and regulation of the course of one’s own thinking. The latter engage a broader 
understanding of  thinking and cognition in general and are referred to as epistemic 
understanding. (Kuhn, Dean 2004: 270)
In this theory, several characteristic levels of development can be distinguished 
(Kuhn, Dean 2004 272):
• The realistic level – when knowledge is perceived as objective, unquestionable, and 
an exact reflection/copy of reality (i.e., “Everyone knows exactly what I know.”);
• The absolutist level – when knowledge, although still objective and derived from 
an external source, is stored in the human mind in the form of cognitive repre-
sentations/beliefs that may be true or false depending on external circumstances 
(i.e., “Someone may know or understand events differently from me, but only one 
of these interpretations is true.”);
• The multiplistic (relativistic) level – when knowledge is perceived as a figment 
of the human mind—uncertain, unable to be evaluated as true or false—because 
it is constituted by personal opinions, each of which can be valuable and justified, 
at least in the eyes of a specific subject (i.e., “Others are entitled to their own opin-
ions, which are different from mine.”); and
• The evaluative level – knowledge, although generated by the human mind as an 
interpretation of reality, comprises judgments that can be evaluated and compared 
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with each other in terms of their origin or the validity of the arguments and evi-
dence cited in support of them (i.e., “Someone who is right can adequately prove 
and argue their beliefs.”).
The explanation proposed by Kuhn and Dean offers a clear description of the life-
long trajectory of epistemological development and shows how this development is 
connected with other areas of higher cognitive functions, pointing to their education-
al importance. However, it does not explain the key driving mechanism of change: 
Why and under which factors does a child’s epistemic thinking change? What can 
inhibit or even reverse these changes and why? Why don’t all adults fully realize their 
epistemological potential, but stop at relatively early stages of development (King, 
Kitchener 2004)? 
The answers to these questions are provided by studies of educators interested in 
the educational aspects of epistemic thinking, usually devoted to the understanding 
of specific mental concepts. The most representative example is the work of Bradford 
Pillow (2008), who proposed that four characteristic aspects be distinguished in the 
development of a child’s understanding of cognition, though with the caveat that they 
do not constitute a sequence of separate, disjointed stages of development. They only 
allow us to describe certain developmental trends and to explain the most impor-
tant changes in children’s thinking. These four aspects of knowledge are as follows 
(2008: 299):
a) understanding mental states such as desires, intentions, feelings, and beliefs, 
which appears in early childhood and develops intensely until the break-
through discovery of false beliefs around the age of 4; 
b) awareness of  the existence of various cognitive processes, i.e., knowledge 
about the mental activities which generate, select, transform, manipulate, or 
operate the content of mental states. The main mental processes include atten-
tion, remembering, forgetting, inferring, guessing, and problem-solving. In 
a basic form, awareness of the existence of these processes and their functions 
and characteristics first occurs in the transition period between early and mid-
dle childhood (5–7 years of age) and gradually increases;
c) organizational knowledge, understood as an awareness of  the relationship 
(similarities and differences) between different cognitive processes; such knowl-
edge first starts to grow in late childhood (9–10 years of age); and
d) epistemological thought, which refers to a reflection on the nature of knowl-
edge in general and its relations with reality; it appears in early adolescence 
(13–14 years of age) and develops at an individual pace throughout adult life.
The basic understanding of mental states, described in the literature as “naïve the-
ories of mind,” appears in early childhood—even prior to the age of 3, children learn 
to recognize desires, emotions, and intentions (Białecka-Pikul 2012; Wellman 1985). 
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Before they turn 4, they also acquire the ability to understand human beliefs as rep-
resentations of reality, which may be adequate or consistent with facts, or inadequate 
or false. These early concepts also involve recognizing personal differences in people’s 
mental states and their sources of perception. However, research shows that young 
children do not fully appreciate the way and the extent to which the cognitive activity 
of the human mind can influence a person’s mental states. A quantum leap in chil-
dren’s perception of knowledge and mental processes takes place only around the age 
of 6 or 7 (Pillow 2008: 298). Research shows that before the age of 6, children treat 
knowledge as an objective copy of external reality and do not allow for the possibility 
of multiple, diverse, subjective interpretations of  the same input data provided by 
the senses.
An awareness of various forms of cognitive activity means the awareness of both 
consciously initiated and automatically triggered processes, and includes the recogni-
tion of the functions and characteristics of these processes, their typical outcomes, and 
their conditions of occurrence, i.e., the stimuli that activate them. Pillow says that 
adults can usually name many different forms of mental activity, but that their meta-
epistemic knowledge remains rather limited—superficial and vague. It is rare for the 
average person to be able to explain the mechanisms of information processing that 
occurs during a mental process, e.g., people generally know that attention is selective, 
but usually cannot explain the mechanism of this selectivity. Instead of reflecting on 
a model of selective attention, they know that a person watching TV in a crowded 
room with several conversations going on in the background will probably be able to 
recreate the content of the program they watched, but not the content of the ongo-
ing conversations. They can also attribute this outcome to the process of focusing on 
important information or blocking useless information. They may also judge it as 
difficult, requiring a lot of effort, and prone to distraction—depending on the indi-
vidual’s abilities, knowledge, and beliefs about attention. In other words, the knowl-
edge of most average adults about specific cognitive processes is casual and contextual, 
firmly embedded in the realities of everyday life, involving an awareness of the likely 
or desired results of a mental activity rather than a precise explanation of its mecha-
nisms (Pillow 2008: 300).
In a child, the knowledge of the mind’s cognitive activity begins between the ages 
of 5 and 7, possibly influenced by educational experiences. While it is true that small 
children (3–4 years old) may already use simple terminology to name some cognitive 
processes (“I know,” “I think,” etc.), they do not appreciate the role these processes play 
in constructing the cognitive representation of reality. It is only during their primary-
school education and within the requirements set by the school that their awareness 
of the diverse and complex activity of the human mind increases considerably. Pillow 
says that “during early childhood, knowledge of mental functioning is organized in 
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terms of relations among beliefs, desires, action, and perception, and during middle 
childhood, this simple belief–desire reasoning begins to be elaborated into a concep-
tion of  the mind as an active information processor, in which children understand 
that processes such as reasoning, remembering, learning, and imagining contribute 
to the formation of belief,” and mediate it, significantly influencing the final shape 
of human knowledge (2008: 305). When children’s understanding of  the existence 
of various cognitive processes becomes sufficiently deep and detailed (including an 
awareness of the typical features inherent in each mental activity), they develop the 
ability to consciously reflect on human cognitive functioning and start to organize 
their knowledge in terms of the similarities and differences between the characteristics 
and functions of cognitive processes.
In this context, Henry Wellman’s research on children’s understanding of the con-
cept of mind and brain (1985) seems particularly interesting. In one of the studies, 
Wellman compared adult and childhood perceptions of the role of the brain in human 
activities. The participants of the study were asked if they needed the brain to perform 
various types of activities: mental tasks (memory, knowledge, and dreams); sensory 
activities (looking and tasting); school tasks (learning, counting, etc.); other observ-
able behaviors, both involuntary (coughing) and conscious or deliberate (jumping 
on one leg); and various types of feelings, from physiological reactions (feeling sleepy 
or hungry), through simple emotions (sadness or joy), to complex cognitive feelings 
(curiosity). Adults recognized the role of the brain in all these forms of human activity. 
The youngest children’s answers differed significantly from the adults’ responses. They 
perceived the brain in terms similar as the mind: as a common habitat for various 
conscious cognitive processes, such as thinking, dreaming, learning, etc. For chil-
dren, involuntary, peripheral, and unconscious (passive) behavior does not fit into 
this model. According to Wellman (1985: 190), this proves the internal inconsistency 
of early childhood concepts; the brain seems to be conceptualized on par with other 
organs of the body, as autonomous and separate, with its own designated area of activ-
ity: the eyes see, the legs walk, the ears hear, and the brain thinks. Consequently, 
young children believe that the brain can be “turned off” and one can stop thinking 
(Flavell, Green, Flavell 1995: 79). It is only at school age that this view of the mind 
becomes more physiological or embodied, as children begin to gradually notice the 
differences between the brain—which is also involved in automatic processes (invol-
untary, inadvertent, and uncontrollable)—and the mind as the center of exclusively 
intentional, consciously activated cognitive activities. As they start discerning these 
differences, children progress towards an awareness of the functional interdependence 
between the organs: they now perceive the brain as controlling other organs of the 
body, but at the same time as aided by the information flowing from them. This way, 
children develop an understanding of the “stream of consciousness,” so they realize 
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that the brain cannot be switched off or stopped—that it always works, even when we 
are seemingly doing nothing, for example, when we are sleeping.
Research shows that as children’s knowledge transforms into an increasingly 
ordered, organized, and conscious form, a new, more abstract concept of mental phe-
nomena begins to emerge (Pillow 2008: 307).
• First, children begin to realize that mental processes are not singular, fleeting, or 
isolated events, but on the contrary, that thinking is a complex and multidimen-
sional sequence of  systematic, organized, and purposeful activities undertaken 
in the course of planning, problem-solving, and decision-making. This is a very 
important metacognitive milestone, as the child’s conception of the mind is chang-
ing: “viewing thought in terms of deliberately related cognitive acts implies knowl-
edge of the mind as an organized processor of information” (Pillow 2008: 32);
• Later, children also begin to notice that some cognitive processes are subjective 
interpretations based on incomplete or ambiguous premises (input data), which 
may lead to cognitively uncertain results, or to different, subjective points of view 
(perception perspectives). According to Paula J. Schwanenflugel, children’s subjec-
tive experiences of the uncertainty or even ambiguity of the outcomes of cogni-
tion initiates and supports the process of building a constructive theory of mind 
(as cited in: Pillow 2008: 32), thus instigating a number of significant changes in 
children’s understanding of cognitive processes.
Many researchers emphasize that it is the perception of subjectivity as an inherent 
feature of knowledge and cognition that opens the way to the development of epis-
temological reflection (Alexander, Schwanenflugel 1996; Białecka-Pikul 2012; Kuhn 
2000). True, the understanding of  subjectivity in its most basic form appears even 
in early childhood, but then it is still very superficial and limited. Children who are 
4 or 5 years old appreciate that a person may have false beliefs, but they attribute this 
only to objective external circumstances. As a result, they find it easier to understand 
differences in the perceptual experience of reality that arises from the different exter-
nal circumstances of  the participants/witnesses of an event (situational viewpoints) 
than individual perspectives of  people with different psychological characteristics, 
such as character traits, attitudes, beliefs, emotions, etc. (subjective viewpoints) (Hig-
gins, as cited in: Pillow 2008: 15). Beginning around age 7, children begin to recog-
nize that internal mental processes can also contribute to the formation of subjective 
interpretations of reality. However, initially this understanding is specific, embedded 
in a situational context: children admit that ambiguous information may be misin-
terpreted by a naïve, manipulated, or biased observer (Pillow 2008: 15). Only later, 
as adolescents, will they gain the full awareness that human knowledge and beliefs are 
inherently subjective because they are constructed by the mind in the course of com-
plex psychological processes that leave a  strong mark on the final shape of human 
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cognition. As Kuhn concludes, the driving force of epistemological development lies 
in the ability to coordinate and reconcile the subjective and objective dimensions 
of knowledge, maintaining a balance between them, depending on the circumstances, 
task, or field of learning (Kuhn, Dean 2004: 271).
Children’s Concepts of Knowledge and Learning in Light 
of Empirical Research
The study presented below was conducted as part of an MA seminar on developing 
children’s motivation to learn. The article uses the research material collected by Anna 
Gawrych (2017) according to Piaget’s clinical interview. At the outset, the children 
were asked to make a drawing: “I would like to ask you for help—I’m writing a book 
for children about knowledge and learning, but I have no idea for a cover for this 
book. Think about the difference between these two concepts: knowledge and learn-
ing. What should the cover show so that everyone notices the difference immediately? 
Try to draw such a cover.” After they finished drawing a picture, the children were 
asked to explain: “What does your drawing show? How would you explain to a friend 
the way knowledge differs from learning?”1
Thirty children participated in the research, including 15 pupils from grades 
2 and 3. The vast majority of children came from two-parent families (96.7%), with 
a high or medium sociocultural status (30% and 46.7%, respectively). The results 
of  the semantic analysis of  the collected verbal and visual materials are presented 
below. 
According to the children, the most important difference between the two con-
cepts is that learning is a process (acting or doing something) and knowledge is a state, 
a resource. Interestingly, however, not all the children saw a cause–effect relationship 
between learning and knowledge: to know something, you must learn it beforehand, 
understand it, and remember it: “Once we learn something, we know it” (Zbyszek, 
3rd grade). Some explanations were based on a  temporal relationship: “Learning 
comes first, then knowledge” (Mateusz, 2nd grade). 
The respondents explained the essence of learning as gaining knowledge and new 
experiences (16 children) or acquiring wisdom (2 children). Their explanations were 
firmly rooted in the context of specific school experiences, which is especially con-
spicuous in the drawings of the classroom, a blackboard, a teacher explaining a task, 
1 Due to the volume of  the material collected, only the first two of  eight questions planned in the 
interview were used in this article. The full structure of the interview is described in the thesis written 
by A. Gawrych (2017) under my supervision. The student agreed to use the empirical material that she 
collected to prepare this publication.
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etc. (Fig. 1). Learning is seen in terms of an obligation, not always a pleasant one, 
imposed by adults: “Learning is when we go to school” (Marta, 2nd grade); “It’s gain-
ing knowledge in class” (Marta, 3rd grade); “We learn when the teacher is explaining 
things in the classroom” (Natalka, 3rd grade); “We write and solve different problems” 
(Zbyszek, 3rd grade); “Learning is when the teacher assigns homework—what we 
learned in class” (Maks, 2nd grade); “We learn when we read books and when the 
teacher praises me” (Natalia, 3rd grade); “Learning is solving many tasks” (Paulina, 
3rd grade); “Learning is repetition, assigning homework, and answering the teacher’s 
questions in class” (Mateusz, 2nd grade); “It’s a kind of an obligation to have a good 
job in the future” (Kinga, 3rd grade). 
Fig. 1. “Children learn at school, and knowledge is wisdom, but wisdom from books” 
(Paulina, 3rd grade)
Source: Gawrych 2017: 57
Children associated learning with the outside world, play, and extracurricular 
activities much less frequently (Fig. 2): “We learn to play ball” (Wojtek, 3rd grade); 
“We learn when we visit a castle during a trip” (Maks, 2nd grade); “Learning is gain-
ing knowledge on a trip to the mountains” (Paulina, 2nd grade); or “Because when 
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I learn, it’s like I was climbing to the top of a mountain, and then I know things like 
in an encyclopedia” (Adaś, 2nd grade). The analysis of children’s statements reveals 
two key characteristics attributed to learning:
a) External source – learning is organized, guided, and assessed by adults. The 
children themselves do not perceive their own influence on the course of learn-
ing: you have to do what the teacher tells you to do
b) Repetition or multiplicity – to learn something, you have to repeat an activity 
many times, to practice and revise it. According to Ingrid Pramling (1986), 
grasping this truth marks the beginning of the development of childhood con-
cepts of learning and, in the developmental sense, is a step ahead of the knowl-
edge of learning as a mental activity.
Fig. 2. “The boy is playing soccer and is happy because he is learning something new. 
Knowledge is what I can do and what I know that I didn’t know before.” (Michał, 2nd grade)
This does not mean, however, that children are unaware of the involvement of the 
mind in the learning process. The statements of  the respondents included mental 
activities such as thinking (24 children), listening (3 children), remembering (6 chil-
dren), understanding ( 2 children), and focus (4 children). Here are some examples 
of  such statements: “We listen and then all the thoughts enter our mind and we 
157
VARIA
remember” (Adaś, 2nd grade); “We remember information and think” (Staś, 2nd 
grade); “The head absorbs more knowledge” (Mateusz, 2nd grade); “We expand our 
gray matter” (Staś, 3rd grade); “Learning is thinking, we feel warm and our thinking 
develops” (Wojtek, 3rd grade); “We learn to keep something in our head, we gain 
wisdom” (Amelia, 2nd grade).
Unlike the idea of learning, the more abstract concept of knowledge turned out 
to be much more difficult to define: the children had a clear problem finding suffi-
ciently precise words and creating a generalized definition. Their explanations can be 
placed on a continuum, ranging between the perception of knowledge as an objective 
and coming from sources external to oneself (knowledge comes from books or from 
the teacher) and an understanding of knowledge as an internal, subjective category 
(knowledge is the content of  the human mind, everything we know; Fig. 4). Such 
a variety of answers reflects the developmental trends which are well-described in the 
literature and proves that children’s concepts of knowledge are undergoing intensive 
evolution and crystallization (Table 1).
Table 1. Children’s Concepts of Knowledge 
Knowledge as an objective, external 
category: Subjective concept of knowledge:
 • “Knowledge is wisdom, but it is wisdom 
gained in school”
 • “Knowledge is taken from books”
 • “Knowledge is in the encyclopedia”
 • “The teacher passes on knowledge to us, 
and this will come in handy later in life”
 • “Knowledge is books, a globe, a map” 
 • “Knowledge is something that school 
will give me”
 • “It’s something I have in my head”
 • “Knowledge is all things in the head” 
 • “Everything we know”
 • “Knowledge is what I already know
Intermediate/transitional concepts of knowledge; 
knowledge as the sum of the contents of many minds:
“The whole globe knows something”
“Poles have nice ideas”
“Humanity has knowledge”
From a  developmental point of  view, it is more advanced to see knowledge as 
the content of the human mind. The surveyed children identified three basic aspects 
of knowledge:
a) The novelty of  the information gained: “Knowledge is what I already know 
and can do that I didn’t know before (Michał, 2nd grade); “When we gain new 
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experiences that are useful in life” (Kamil, 2nd grade); “Knowledge is learning 
something new that I didn’t know before” (Julian, 3rd grade)
b) The need to intellectually “domesticate” knowledge – “Knowledge is thinking” 
(Wojtek, 3rd grade); “We know because we have already learned by heart” 
(Adaś, 2nd grade); “We know something and we understand what it is” (Kin-
ga, 3rd grade)
c) The practical usefulness of knowledge – “Knowledge is wisdom” (11 children); 
“an open mind” (Staś, 3rd grade); the ability to create new, interesting ideas 
(6 children), often represented in the drawings by the symbol of a light bulb 
(Figs. 2 and 3). 
Fig. 3. “A girl who is explaining different tasks to us and a boy who has different ideas. 
Learning is studying and knowledge is wisdom. We learn to be someone very important one 
day, then we can achieve something in the future.” (Natalia, 2nd grade) 
While identifying knowledge with wisdom or ingenuity may seem too broad, it 
is likely the result of perceiving knowledge as coming from an authority. On the one 
hand, knowledge is the content of the human mind, but on the other hand, not eve-
ryone has enough knowledge to be taken for a wise person (the more knowledge one 
has, the wiser one is). The apparent contradiction in this childhood belief confirms 
the thesis expressed by many researchers that epistemological knowledge, at least in 
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the early stages of  development, does not form an internally coherent theory, but 
rather resembles a set of loosely related casual beliefs, which are emotionally charged, 
often resistant to logic, and changeable, because they are built on the basis of current 
experience (Schommer-Aikins 2002).
Fig. 4. “The girl learns by thinking in the brain. This knowledge is already in her head.” 
(Aleksandra, 2nd grade)
Conclusion
This empirical study does not claim the right to formulate generalizations. The 
purpose was rather to make readers aware that the epistemological thinking of young-
er school-aged children exhibits qualitatively important changes, new areas of sensi-
tivity, and the reflection that the teacher should notice and support. Although at this 
age—according to the development trajectory described by Kuhn and Dean (2004)—
children’s reasoning is still deeply rooted in the absolutist perception of knowledge, 
they begin to notice the role that various mental processes (thinking, attention, mem-
ory, understanding) play in constructing knowledge. Under the influence of school, 
they develop the need to understand these processes and to subject them to conscious 
control. A reflection on the structure and course of these cognitive processes emerges 
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spontaneously, as does the “organizational knowledge” (Pillow 2008), i.e., the aware-
ness that these mental activities do not occur in isolation, but form a complex chain 
of interactions. The child needs the help of a teacher to understand the characteristics 
and the relationships between the mental operations that constitute thinking and 
learning.
This research also shows that, in children’s consciousness, the understanding of the 
learning process is bound to the concept of knowledge (Fig. 5): they constantly inter-
act, influence, and shape each other. As Pramling states (1986: 36–37), the develop-
ment of children’s concepts of  learning consists of three basic stages: a) learning in 
order to do something, b) learning to know something, and c) learning to understand 
the world. The vast majority of the study participants are in the second stage of devel-
opment: the children are clearly aware of their own active role in the learning process, 
they know that in order to master a skill, it is necessary to repeat it many times, to 
practice it, and to solve many tasks in order to become proficient. However, they 
identify this building of knowledge mainly with quantitative processes: remembering 
or gathering data, facts, and information in the mind, which is evaluable in terms 
of “true or false” and comes from the outside (from books or from the teacher). On 
the one hand, the use of such an objectivist conception of knowledge is a natural stage 
in human epistemic development (Białecka-Pikul 2012; Kuhn, Dean 2004; Wellman 
1985). On the other hand, the beginning of school education requires the formative 
intervention of  the environment—an intervention that will help children to move 
from perceiving knowledge in purely objective terms to understanding it as a  sub-
jective, personal interpretation of  information, which requires them to think criti-
cally, weigh arguments, and recognize contextual factors. Only perceiving knowledge 
as being refutable and requiring justification and argumentation activates such areas 
of epistemological reflection as critical thinking, investigating the sources of one’s own 
knowledge, realizing the criteria of its validity, the strength of arguments, etc. Encour-
aging such a reflection is an important task of early education. The statements of some 
of the respondents indicate that they are ready for such reflection, e.g., “Knowledge 
means an open mind, so as not to be such a person who doesn’t have a goal and who 
doesn’t learn from mistakes” (1 person).
161
VARIA
Fig. 5. Relationships between children concepts of knowledge and learning in light of the 
conducted research
Concepts of learning Concepts of knowledge
1. Learning in order to do
learning as action, being involved and gaining 
experience
No concept of knowledge
the pre-reflection stage – skills are perceived 
as the result of thinking “I figured out how 
to do it”
2. Learning in order to know
learning is gaining knowledge about the 
world
An objective concept of knowledge 
knowledge as the content of the human mind 
but viewed as the sum of objective, verifiable 
information
3. Learning in order understand
learning is understanding the meaning of 
things and events in the world and their 
mutual relationships
Transition to a subjective 
concept of knowledge
understanding based on the question “why” 
permits various explanations and requires 
justification and argumentation
Epistemological reflection
on the sources and criteria for the validity of knowledge and 
one’s own role in building and organizing it
“When we know something it means that we understand it” (2 people). However, 
activating such thinking is up to the teacher and the epistemological atmosphere they 
build in the classroom—the questions they consistently and systematically ask: How 
do we know what we know? Why do we think that? What confirms our thinking? 
How do we explain this to someone who disagrees with us?
To sum up, numerous studies indicate that epistemic thinking is an important 
factor that shapes the effectiveness of education at an earlier school age (Bendixen, 
Feucht 2010; Kuhn, Weinstock 2002). The better children understand the mecha-
nisms of the learning process, the faster they are able to take conscious control of it. 
The better they understand what knowledge is and how it can be organized in the 
human mind, the more aware they become of  their own role in constructing this 
knowledge (Pramling 1986). However, none of these areas of consciousness develop 
automatically–the educational setting can play both a stimulating and impeding role 
in this process. There are empirical grounds to believe that this type of didactic inter-
vention may be effective and beneficial even at the stage of early education (Hofer, 
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